Private Easements in Public Ways by Herman, Morton G.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 35 
Number 4 Annual Meeting of the Washington 
State Bar Association 
11-1-1960 
Private Easements in Public Ways 
Morton G. Herman 





 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Morton G. Herman, Comment, Private Easements in Public Ways, 35 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 657 (1960). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol35/iss4/10 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
COMMENTS
PRIVATE EASEMENTS 'IN PUBLIC WAYS
Few property owners realize that their right to travel on public
thoroughfares is not an absolute right. Private demand as well as pub-
lic need often necessitates official vacation or alteration of the public
easement in dedicated streets and highways, requiring a value .judg-
ment to be made between public benefit and private injury when the
matter reaches the litigation stage. The issue discussed in this Com-
ment typically presents itself when the city, county, or state vacates
or alters a land service road,' dedicated for general access of residents
in the area, to expedite a program of urban renewal or new highway
facilities. Upon such action being taken, the problem is raised as to
whether the resident-user can obtain compensation for the loss in prop-
erty value, due to the elimination of access rights.
Ordinarily private owners purchase property relying on representa-
tions as to the existence of public streets, alleys, or other facilities
indicated on the plat to which the vendor refers. Therefore, -upon
public vacation or alteration, the problems created are first, an evalu-
ation of the creation and nature of easement rights acquired by private
property owners in the subdivision, and second,, the compensation ob-
tainable for deprivation of these rights by public action.
Two basic rights will be separately discussed in this Comment.
First, the public right of user in streets dedicated for public use will
be referred to as the "public easement"; and second, the private right
of user created by estoppel, hereinafter called the "private easement."
Although each is created in a similar manner, each propagates com-
mon as well as distinguishable property rights. In connection with the
discussion of these easements, some reference will also be made to
other analogous easements created by similar theories, for the pur-
pose of furnishing background and comparison.
"Land-service road" is a term used to describe the ordinary road or highway,
constructed to enable abutting landowners to have access to the outside world, as dis-
tinguished from the "limited-access" road which is a "traffic-service road" designed
primarily to move traffic. Conversely, a limited-access highway may be defined as a
roadway designed particularly for the movement of through traffic, upon which cross
traffic has been eliminated or severely curtailed, with entrances and exits strictly con-
trolled, and as to which abutting landowners have no easement or right of access
different from that enjoyed by the general public. Such highways are sometimes called
"freeways," "thruways," "expressways," "parkways," or "belt-lines." See Annot., 43
A.L.R.2d 1072 (1955).
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THE CREATION OF THE PRIVATE EASEMENT IN PUBLIC WAYS
The cases generally hold that the grantee purchasing land with ref-
erence to a map or plat, delineating streets or alleys vital to his ingress
and egress, may acquire an easement over these ways even though his
lot does not abut on the particular street or alley.2 A more liberal
rule, not requiring the element of necessity for ingress and egress, gives
the grantee to whom a conveyance is made by reference to map or plat
a private right to use all streets and alleys delineated thereon.'
Three general theories of creation of these private easements are
asserted by the courts. The first is an easement arising by estoppel;
one who conveys land with reference to map or plat, without including
such reference in the deed itself, is estopped to deny the existence of
the easement because of his inducing the grantee to believe that the
streets or other public places exist as indicated on the plat.' This is
called estoppel by representation.' Second is the view that a convey-
ance with reference to the map or plat incorporated into the deed gives
rise to an implied grant of easement.6 A third view, which is severely
criticized by prominent authors,7 is that an easement is created by
"implied dedication" when the grantor sells with reference to a map
or plat.8 In this case estoppel is probably a better analysis than im-
plied dedication. The grantor who induced the reliance should be held
for the ways he indicated in persuading the grantee to make the pur-
chase. Likewise, common grantees claiming under such a grantor are
estopped as against each other to deny the easement.'
?Burke v. Wall, 29 La. Ann. 38, 29 Am. Rep. 316 (1877) ; Downey v. Hood, 203
Mass. 4, 89 N.E. 24 (1909) ; Pearson v. Allen, 151 Mass. 79, 23 N.E. 731 (1890) ;
Fox v. Union Sugar Ref., 109 Mass. 292 (1872) ; Kelley v. Penfield, 133 App. Div. 367,
117 N.Y.S. 379 (1909) ; Henson v. Stine, 74 Ohio App. 221, 57 N.E.2d 785 (1943);
see also Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 607.
3 Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 607, 613 (1949).
4 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 800, p. 31, n. 5 (1939) (citing Van Buren v. Trum-
bull, 92 Wash. 691, 159 Pac. 891 (1916)).
5 Ibid.
6 1 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY, § 409 (3d ed. 1939).
"3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, § 409 (1952); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 800
(1939).
8 Prescott v. Edwards, 117 Cal. 298, 49 Pac. 178 (1897) ; Maywood Co. v. Village
of Maywood, 118 Ill. 61, 6 N.E. 866 (1886) ; Hille v. Nill, 58 N.D. 536, 226 N.W. 635
(1929) ; Van Buren v. Trumbull, 92 Wash. 691, 159 Pac. 891 (1916).
9 Threedy v. Brennan, 131 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1942) ; Severo v. Pache Co., 75 Cal.
App.2d 30, 170 P.2d 40 (1946) ; Moffatt v. Tight, 44 Cal. App.2d 643, 112 P.2d 910
(1941) ; Fisk v. Ley, 76 Conn. 295, 56 Atl. 559 (1903) ; Mills v. Smith, 203 Ga. 444,
47 S.E.2d 260 (1948) ; McCue v. Berge, 385 Ill. 292, 52 N.E.2d 789 (1944) ; Schickli
v. Keeling, 307 Ky. 210, 210 S.W.2d 780 (1948) ; James v. Delery, 211 La. 306, 29 So.
2d 858 (1947) ; Bartlett v. City of Bangor, 67 Me. 460 (1878) ; Dubinsky v. Cama, 261
Mass. 47, 158 N.E. 321 (1927) ; Horton v. Williams, 99 Mich. 423 (1894); Dill v.
School Board, 47 N.J.Eq. 421, 20 Atl. 739 (1890) ; Mills v. City of New York, 269
App. Div. 306, 55 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1945) ; Harder v. Ambassador Realty Co., 258 App.
Div. 922, 16 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1939) ; Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N.C. 227, 25 S.E.2d 889
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The tendency of some courts, to refer to a sale of land by refer-
ence to an unrecorded plat as creating an easement by implied dedi-
cation,1" leads to confusion of the public and private easement." A
factor which contributes to this confusion is the rule that one whose
property abuts on an existing street or alley is deemed to have private
rights of ingress and egress from his property to that street or alley."
However, this right of ingress and egress arises not by 'estoppel, or
implied dedication, but rather because the property owner bought
land on a street which was already committed to public use. There-
fore the owner shares the public easement, which is not dependent on
his being a property owner, and he may also have a private easement
arising by virtue of estoppel or implied grant. The latter right cannot
be taken without full compensation and due process. 8
(1943) ; Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Forster, 346 Pa. 59, 29 A2d 496 (1943);
Wilson v. Acree, 97 Tenn. 378, 37 S.W. 90 (1896); Boyd v. Dillard, 151 S.W.2d 847
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941) ; Lindsay v. James, 188 Va. 646, 51 S.E.2d 326 (1949) ; Howell
v. King County, 16 Wn.2d 557, 134 P.2d 80 (1943) ; It re Vacating Platt of Chiwaukee,
254 Wis. 273, 36 N.W.2d 61 (1949).
10 Highland Realty Co. v. Avondale Land Co., 174 Ala. 326, 56 So. 716 (1911);
Nash v. Pendleton, 183 Ark. 339, 35 S.W.2d 1002 (1931) ; Holthoff v. Joyce, 174 Ark.
248, 294 S.W. 1006 (1927) ; Harrison v. Augusta Factory, 73 Ga. 447 (1884) ; Village
of Benld v. Dorsey, 311 Ill. 192, 142 N.E. 563 (1924) ; Schneider v. Jacob,'86 Ky. 101,
5 S.W. 350 (1887) ; City of New Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co., 131 La. 1092, 60
So. 695 (1913) ; Horton v. Williams, 99 Mich. 423, 58 N.W. 369 (1894) ; Schaller V.
Town of Florence, 193 Minn. 604, 259 N.W. 529 (1935) ; Skrmetta v. Moore, 202 Miss.
585, 30 So. 2d 53 (1947) ; Schell v. Jefferson, 357 Mo. 1020, 212 S.W.2d 430 (1948) ;
Heitz v. City of St. Louis, 110 Mo. 618, 19 S.W. 735 (1892); Kesselman v. Goldsten,
148 Neb. 452, 27 N.W.2d 692 (1947) ; Shearer v. City of Reno, 36 Nev. 443, 136 Pac.
705 (1913) ; Carter v. City of Portland, 4 Ore.'339 (1873) ; Walker v. Walker, 153
Pa. Super. 20, 33 A.2d 455 (1943) ; Wolf v. Brass, 72 Tex. 133, 12 S.W. 159 (1888) ;
Shertzer v. Hillman Inv. Co., 52 Wash. 492, 100 Pac. 982 (1909) ; Lueders v. Tenino,
49 Wash. 521, 95 Pac. 1089 (1908).
"1In an early California case, People v. Reed, 81 Cal. 70, 22 Pac. 474 (1889), the
court made a clear distinction between public and private rights growing out of the
conveyance of lots by reference to a map or plat, stating: "It is well settled.., that
the making and filing of a map, designating certain streets thereon, is only an offer to
dedicate such streets to the -public, and that the dedication does not become effectual
and irrevocable until the same is accepted by the public.... But it is not the mere
making of the map, or its delivery or exhibition to private individuals, that constitutes
the offer of dedication to the public, but the filing; and where the right to claim the
street by the public rests upon the map alone, there is no offer to be accepted until the
same is filed for record." The court further pointed out that as between common
grantees the only rights arising would be by virtue of estoppel. The court recognized
the fact that there were authorities sustaining the position that where the owner sur-
veys and plats his property, and makes sales of lots with reference to such plat the
streets designated thereon are irrevocably dedicated to the public as streets, but con-
tinued: "it may be different as between [the property owner] and private individuals
to whom he has made sales of property with reference to the map. Much of the con-
fusion in the decided cases has... grown out of the failure to distinguish between the
right of the public authorities to claim a dedication, and the right of the purchaser to
compel the opening of a street on the ground of estoppel."
12 Rose v. State, 19 Cal2d 713, 123 P2d 505 (1942). See also 25 Am. JuR., High-
ways § 154, p. 448, n. 13.
3. City of York v. Iowa-Nebraska Light & Power. Co., 109 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1940),
cert. denied 309 U.S. 690 (1940). People v. Russell, 48 Cal.2d 189, 309 P.2d 10 (1957) ;
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As in the case of the abutting owner, the nonabutting landowner
can conceivably have two distinct easement rights: the first is the
above mentioned public right; the second is the easement right aris-
ing by estoppel or implied grant. However, the extent of the non-
abutting owner's easement is subject to a great deal of confusion."4
There are three general views 5 adopted by different jurisdictions to
determine the extent of the nonabutter's easement rights in streets of
the subdivision. 6
The Blending Theory. The confusion resulting from failure to dis-
tinguish between the private easement and the public easement leads
some courts to a conclusion that the pre-existing private easement will
blend with the public easement upon actual or implied dedication of
the subdivision." This may be termed the "blending theory." Appli-
cation of this theory leads to utter confusion regarding the private
owner's rights. For example, assume grantee purchases Blackacre re-
lying on a plat delineating streets, alleys, and parks prior to the dedi-
cation of the plat. Upon such a purchase, most courts recognize the
existence of a private easement to ways delineated on the plat to which
the grantor made reference. The taking of such an easement right
would be compensable.' Assume that subsequently the grantor dedi-
cates the plat, and the municipality accepts. Now the grantee has,
over and above his private right of user (if such still exists after dedi-
cation), a public right or easement in the streets of the subdivision.
Does the mere acquisition of a public easement by virtue of dedica-
tion extinquish this prior private right, which could have been enforced
Rose v. State, 19 Cal.2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942) ; Siemers v. St. Louis Elec. Terminal
Ry., 343 Mo. 1201, 125 S.W.2d 865 (1938) ; see also 39 C.J.S. Highways § 141.
14 See Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 607.
15 The "broad" view, or "unity" rule is that the private right of the grantee extends
to all the streets, alleys, parks, or other open areas delineated upon the plat. The
"intermediate" view, or "beneficial" or "full enjoyment" rule is that the extent of such
private right is limited to such streets and alleys as are reasonably or materially bene-
ficial to the grantee and of which the deprivation would reduce the value of his lot.
The third view is the "narrow" or "necessary" rule, which provides that such a private
right is limited to the abutting streets and such others as are necessary to give the
grantee access to a public highway.
16 Washington apparently follows a rule similar to the narrow rule, holding that the
nonabutting owner is entitled only to reasonable and necessary access to his property.
Capitol Hill Methodist Church v. City of Seattle, 52 Wn.2d 359, 324 P.2d 1113 (1958),
noted 34 WASH. L. REv. 212 (1959).
17 Washington, fortunately, does not follow this rule. See cases cited in 7 A.L.R.2d
608, 616 (1949).
18 See notes 12 and 13 supra. Regarding the use of an injunction against other com-
mon grantees obstructing this easement right, see Gerald Park Improvement Ass'n v.
Bini, 138 Conn. 232, 83 A.2d 195 (1951) (where the association was held to have vio-
lated an owner's rights by placing a guard and gate to keep public trespassers from
using private beach facilities in a restricted subdivision).
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as against the grantor and common grantees?"0 If it does, then the
owner is at the mercy of the municipality, since if the latter subse-
quently vacates or alters any street of the subdivision, the 'lot owner
no longer has the right to those things which may have induced his
purchase. The subsequent acquisition of public rights of way, by dedi-
cation, does not justify the result of extinguishment of private rights
of user, even in jurisdictions following the "blending theory."
The Estoppel Theory. A sounder view of the creation of private
easements in public ways is based on the estoppel theory, rather than
implied dedication. This view assumes that the grantee is led to be-
lieve that the streets or other conveniences exist in reality as well as
on the plat shown to the grantee as an inducement for him to pur-
chase. Tiffany calls this "estoppel by representation."2 The Cali-
fornia court, in Danielson v. Sykes,"' dearly indicated that an ease-
ment by estoppel may exist irrespective of any easement arising 'by
virtue of the owner's property abutting on an existing public highway,
stating: "This private easement is entirely independent of the fact of
dedication to public use, and is a private appurtenance to the lots, of
which the owners cannot be divested except by due process of law."
[Citations omitted, emphasis added.]22
THE PRIVATE EASEMENT IN WASHINGTON
The Washington court adopts the distinction between public and
private easements. Thus, vacation of the public right does not extin-
.guish a pre-existing private easement.28 In Van Buren v. Trumbull"
this problem arose in a statute of limitations context." The statute 8
19 See Highway Holding Co. v. Yara Eng'r Corp., 22 N.J. 119, 123 A.2d.511 (1956),
to the effect that a resolution vacating a street does not take away, or in the least
impair, the private rights of an abutting owner; it is only a surrender or extinction of
the public easement. In New Jersey, purchase in reliance on an undedicated plat
dedicates streets, alleys, and other delineated facilities to the public, and such dedica-
tion continues and cannot be revoked except by consent of the municipality.
20 3 TIFFANY, REAL PRoPERY § 800, p. 310, n. 5 (1939).
21 157 Cal. 686, 109 Pac. 87 (1910).
2 2 Id. at 687, 109 Pac. at 88. The court further stated: "It is claimed.., that this
private right of way is limited to the use necessary for ingress and egress and that it
embraces only the street which abuts upon the particular lot in question and such
other streets as may lead therefrom to some public highway or place ... When a lot
conveyed by a deed is described by reference to a map, such map becomes a part of
the deed. If the map exhibits streets and alleys, it necessarily implies or expresses a
design that such passageways shall be used in connection with the lots, and for the
convenience of the owners in going from each lot to any and all the other lots in the
tract laid off." For further cases on this point, see Annot., 28 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1024
(1910). With regard to the effect of vacation on these rights see Annot, 150 A.L.R.
644 (1944). See also Highway Holding Co. v. Yara Eng'r Corp, supra, n. 19.
28 Van Buren v. Trumbull, 92 Wash. 691, 159 Pac. 891 (1916).
24 Ibid.25 WASH. SESs. LAws 1890 c. XIX, § 32, p. 603, which originally provided: "Any
19601
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barred any claim of a public easement in a road which, having been
dedicated, remained unopened for a period of five years. The ques-
tion was whether the vacation effected by the statute would extinguish
private easements in such streets. The court held the vacation had
no effect on private easements of common grantees, declaring that the
two easement rights remained separate and distinct, so that the private
easement was enforceable against common grantees and the grantor.
In Howell v. King County27 the court stated that the Van Buren
rule was based upon the principle that since the dedicator of a plat
could not defeat a grantee's right to an easement in the street upon
which his land abuts, common grantees from him cannot, as among
themselves, question this right. Thus the private easement persists,
unless lost by adverse possession or a tax foreclosure sale." The Van
Buren case definitely established the principle of "easement by estop-
pel" in Washington. 9 However, if the factual situations of the above
cases are analyzed carefully, it may be found that this jurisdiction did
not have to adopt language of easement by estoppel, as the easements
created in these situations are really a result of implied grant.
Burkhard v. Bowen" held that an earlier case, Tamblin v. Crowley, 1
did not modify or limit the Van Buren rule because of the peculiar
circumstances in Tamblin, where the party claiming easement rights
to a strip acquired his abutter's status through a tax foreclosure sale.
The argument successfully urged in the Tamblin case was that the
county road, or part thereof, which has heretofore or may hereafter be authorized,
which remains unopened for public use for the space of five years after the order is
made or authority granted for opening the same, shall be and the same is hereby va-
cated, and the authority for building the same barred by lapse of time."
26 The above article is now codified as RCW 36.87.090 and is substantially the same
as in note 25 supra with the following proviso: "Provided, That this section shall not
apply to any highway, road, street, alley, or other public place dedicated as such in
any plat, whether the land included in such plat is within or without the limits of an
incorporated city or town, or to any land conveyed by deed to the state or to any
county, city or town for highways, roads, streets, alleys, or other public places." See
also RCW 35.79.010 regarding formal vacation on the part of a municipality.
27 16 Wn.2d 557, 134 P.2d 80 (1943).
28 Adverse possession as affecting private easement rights is not within the scope
of this Comment. However, in Turner v. Davisson, 47 Wn.2d 375, 287 P.2d 726 (1955),
the court held in a confusing opinion that since the abutter who acquires the abutting
tract of land by adverse possession cannot trace his title back to a common grantor, he
cannot assert his right to private easements created by representations of his prede-
cessor, who is barred by the adverse possession statute.
29 An interesting sidelight to the easement problem is the effect of title obtained
through tax foreclosure sales or adverse possession when asserted against the
grantee who, or whose predecessor in interest, purchased from the original grantor
who dedicated the subdivision. Tamblin v. Crowley, 99 Wash. 133, 168 Pac. 982 (1917),
held that after vacation of a road, adverse possession, resulting in ultimate title, would
not destroy the easement rights, but a tax foreclosure sale after such vacation will
divest both the private ownership and the private easement.
90 32 Wn.2d 613, 203 P.2d 361 (1949).
31 Supra note 29.
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party could not assert the right of easement by estoppel since he was
unable to claim through a common grantor. The problem of the effect
of tax foreclosures and subsequent sales upon easements was clarified
by the legislature by the enactment in 1959 of RCW 84.64.460.82
Vacation or alteration of the public's easement in public streets
dedicated by virtue of filing and acceptance of the plat does not ex-
tinguish the private easement of purchasers deriving their title through
mesne conveyances traceable to the common grantor. However, caution
should be taken against confusing the right to assert private easements
against other grantees with the right to object to a formal vacation by
the public officials. In: the latter instance no one other than an abutting
owner can object to the vacation, without showing that his property
suffered special damages other than the general damage sustained by
the public in the loss of the public easement."
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS: PRIVATE EASEMENTS V.
LIMITED ACCESS FREEWAYS
Although many opinions can be found dealing with the abutter's
rights respecting private easements implied by law, few if any decisions
have considered the problem of the nonabutter's interests which arise
solely by virtue of plat representations and estoppel. Most cases deal-
ing with the deprivation of property rights through eminent domain
proceedings regard only the rights of abutting owners. Therefore, in
the following sections of this Comment, comparison will often be made
to the. abutter's rights, and analogy drawn to the rights of the non-
abutter.
The question of the effect on abutting or nonabutting easement
rights of changes in the highway pattern has caused much litigation.
Generally the courts, or more fundamentally, the lawyers pleading the
cases, confuse the rights of an abutter or nonabutter to object to the
changing of the existing highway, with the rights these property owners
have by virtue of existing private easements. Freeway or turnpike
problems arise mainly in urban areas, since property is seldom platted
and dedicated in more sparsely settled communities. No matter how
private easements were created, recognition must-be given to the fact
of their existence, and that deprivation of either the abutter's or non-
abutter's easement constitutes a legal injury.
s8 WAsH. Sass. LAWS 1959 c. 129, § 1 at 666, providing that any tax deeds issued
pursuant to a tax foreclosure sale will be subject to private easements existing of
record prior to the year for which the tax was foreclosed.
.
83 Capitol Hill Methodist Church v. City of Seattle, note 16 supra.
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Police Power v. Eminent Domain: A labeling trap. One Washing-
ton attorney made some observations which serve as a starting premise,
pointing out the problem that most often traps the courts and attorneys
alike.84 The trap lies in the method used to determine rights to com-
pensation, i.e. labeling the type of public action which deprives the
individual of his easement, without analysis of the nature of the private
right. If the court finds the public took the right because of a need for
improvements to existing facilities, the action would be classified as
within the police power to regulate traffic. In such a case, the desired
change, no matter how detrimental to landowners in the vicinity, is
not compensable. However, upon finding the action taken is to create
a new mode to handle through traffic, distinguished from merely
changing the existing traffic pattern, the court will label this eminent
domain, and allow the injured party compensation for the loss of an
easement right. But as Clarke points out, the line of distinction be-
tween these two theories is hard to find. 8
The basic problem resolves itself into a judicial balancing of the
cost to the public if deprived of the new mode of travel, against the
necessity and cost to the public of giving each property owner adversely
affected just compensation for lost easement rights. Neither of the
two theories, as they exist, considers anything more than immediate
access rights. Extinguishment of existing subdivision easements seldom
is placed in issue. However the nonabutting property owner's private
easement within the subdivision, arguably at least, is a compensable
property right.
Statutes Protecting Landowners. The eminent domain statute"6
provides that whenever the acquisition of "land, real estate, premises,
or other property" is deemed necessary for public use, a jury is to be
impaneled for determination of the extent of damages by the taking.
The statute states that the taking of any property is compensable. The
language, "or other property" would certainly include existing ease-
ments, they being considered property rights. It should not matter
whether the easement arises by virtue of a purchase in reliance on a
plat, or merely by implication because the land abuts on an existing
s4 Owen Clarke, The Limited-Access Highway, 27 WASH. L. Rzv. 111, 120 (1952).
35 Id. at 121: "But where does the police power end and the power of eminent do-
main begin? This is the baffling question that has caused so much judicial confusion in
right of access cases. Some courts have attempted to, generalize by declaring that the
police power ends when the injury to the property owner in not being paid for his
property is greater than the injury to the public in having to pay for the property."36 RCW 8.04.010.
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dedicated street which is designated for conversion into a limited or
non-access highway.
In Washington the abutter's right of access is protected by a separate
statute,"' which provides that no existing public highway, road or
street shali be constructed as a limited access facility except upon the
waiver, purchase, or condemnation of the abutting owner's right of
access. Special provision is made for existing roadside businesses 8 on
existing service highways which are declared non-access highways.
The statute defines an existing highway as any and all highways, roads,
and streets duly established, constructed and in use. 9 This definition
does not, -however, include new highways, roads, or streets, nor por-
tions of existing ones which are relocated."0
Nature and Scope of the Easement of Nonabutting Owners. The
nonabutting owner's private easement is a property right 1 which is
often taken, but for which compensation is seldom given. The only
cases found allowing recovery for damages to access rights-of-way
were those wherein the easement existed by implication of law because
the property owner happened to abut on a public street. No cases
have been found directly on the point of compensation for loss of ease-
ment rights held by virtue of subdivision plat representations. It seems
that an easement held by a nonabutting owner should be as compensable
a property right as the easement held by an abutter.
Olsen v. Jacobs4" was a case dealing only with the right of non-
abutting property owners to set aside or object to public vacation of
a street. Though the case did not discuss the law pertaining to the
rights and remedies of common grantees against each other for pro-
tection of subdivision easements, the court did come up with some
disturbing language, which may or may not affect such rights. Plaintiffs
were owners of homes abutting on Haller Circle, from which the road
vacated provided the only direct access to the lake shore. Defendants
were owners of property immediately adjacent to the road vacated.
'Plaintiffs claimed the closing of the road would shut. off ingress and
egress from Haller Lake and further that they would be deprived of





*41 Rose v. State,. 19 Cal.2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); Danielson v. Sykes, 157 Cal.
686, 109 Pac. 87- (1910). See also 25 Am. JuR., Highways § 154; 39 C.J.S., Highways
§'141 : : . : ""
42193 Wash. 506, 76 P.2d 607 (1938).
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across the water from the street purported to have been closed, and
one other street on the west side of the lake. The court, in denying
the relief sought, held the inability to reach the lake does not affect
the question of ingress from plaintiffs' property. The opinion further
stated that the question of ingress and egress can relate only to the
property owned by the complaining party, and not to some other
property or place of business or amusement in the subdivision.
While the rule propounded in the Olsen case may be entirely correct
in terms of right to object to public vacation, it certainly fails to account
for the fact that property values of the Hailer Lake subdivision
probably depended upon accessibility to the lake. This factor most
likely was an inducement which persuaded the plaintiffs to purchase
the property in the first instance. If the defendants were common
grantees, in the same subdivision, this should have been alleged, and
injunction should have been sought against the defendant's obstruction
of the street once it had been vacated.
Capitol Hill Methodist Church v. Seattle" held that any private
easement in a street by virtue of reliance on plat delineations is only
an easement for those ways which are necessary for reasonable access
to surrounding properties. The court cited several cases45 in support
of this point, but none of these had expressed such a limited application
of the rule." The Capitol Hill case mentioned the Olsen case, the
holding of which is practically identical, but neither case decided the
exact scope or extent of these private easements in Washington. The
only conclusion to be reached is that the private easement exists as
against other common grantees, but has no effect on the vacation of
the public easement by the municipality; and conversely, vacation has
43 Gerald Park Improvement Ass'n v. Bini, 138 Conn. 232, 83 A.2d 195 (1951).
See also note 18 supra.
4452 Wn.2d 359, 324 P.2d 113 (1958).
45 Brown v. Olmsted, 49 Wn.2d 210, 299 P.2d 564 (1956) ; Burkhard v. Bowen, 32
Wn.2d 613, 203 P.2d 361 (1949) ; Howell v. King County, 16 Wn.2d 557, 134 P.2d 80
(1943) ; Van Buren v. Trumbull, 92 Wash. 691, 159 Pac. 891 (1916).
46 See also Ponischil v. Hoquiam Sash & Door Co., 41 Wash. 303, 83 Pac. 316
(1906), where plaintiff owned a lot abutting on the north west corner of the intersec-
tion of Sixth and "H" streets. Defendant, owning lots north of plaintiff abutting both
sides of "H" street at the intersection of Fifth and "H" streets, sought to have the
abutting portion of "H" street (north of plaintiff's) vacated. This vacation formed a
cul de sac as to plaintiff's access over "H" street to Fifth street. The court held that
the plaintiff as nonabutting owners to the portion vacated suffered no other injury by
vacation save degree than did the public. Therefore because the plaintiff still had
ingress and egress by virtue of abutting Sixth street, and the non-vacated portion of
"H" street forming an intersection with Sixth street, they could not show unreason-
able damage to their access. The court pointed out that the plaintiff was not actually
"within the cul de sac created by the vacation, but only at its entrance !" There was
no discussion of the problem of loss of possible easement rights by virtue of sale by
reliance on the plat and dedication thereof.
[VOL. 35
PRIVATE EASEMENTS
no affect on the enforcement of private easements as against other
owners in the subdivision.
Recognizing the existence of private easements in Washington, it
must be conceded that they are property rights, and are protected
under the statutes mentioned above. Therefore the next problem isto
examine the effect of alteration of existing streets on these private
property rights. The question is whether alteration, adversely affecting
these private easements, will create a claim for damages by property
owners showing a diminution in their property values. In conjunction
with this, examination should be made to find what the property owner
must show in order to prove a diminution in his property value.
EFFECT OF CONDEMNATION ON PRIVATE EASEMENT RIGHTS
Private easements can be further refined into two distinct types.
The first is the easement implied by law arising by virtue of the prop-
erty abutting on an existing public highway. This easement is dis-
tinguishable from easements created by estoppel, because the latter
easement is implied from representations made by the grantor, whereas
the former is a rule of law. A satisfactory explanation for the ease-
ment raised by law can be found neither in its historical, nor logical
development, but this right has gained such acceptance that there is
little chance that the doctrine will be overturned."" A further distinc-
tion should be made from the easement raised by law and that which
arises from implied grant or incorporation in the actual deed of con-
veyance.
Loss of Direct Access. Upon the conversion of a land service road
into a limited access highway, there is a compensable taking of the
property right of ingress and egress.," Where the abutter's direct access
is lost by a conversion, but a service road through which the property
owner has access to the highway at some distant point is provided by
47Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1072 (1955); Clarke, The Limited-Access Highway, 27
WASn. L. REv. 111 (1952).48 People v. La Macchia, 41 Cal.2d 738, 264 P.2d 15 (1953) ; Boxherger v. State
Highway Comm'n, 126 Col. 526, 251 P.2d 920 (1952) ; Department of Pub. Works
& Bldgs. v. Wolf, 414 Ill. 386, 111 N.E.2d 322 (1953); Nichols v. Commonwealth,
331 Mass. 581, 121 N.E.2d 56 (1954); Petition of Burnquist, 220 Minn. 48, 19 N.W.2d
394 (1945); Board of Supervisors v. Wilkin, 260 App. Div. 366, 22 N.Y.S.2d 465
(1940) ; In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes, 93 Ohio App. 179,
112 N.E2d 411 (1952) ; State Highway Comm'n v. Burke, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P.2d 783
(1954) ; Mcoran v. State, 155 Wash. Dec.-36, 345 P.2d 598 (1959) ; State v. Fox,
f3 Wn.2d 216, 332 P.2d 943 (1958); State v. Calkins, 50 Wn2d 716, 314 P.2d 449
(1957) ; Walker v. State, 48 Wn.2d 587, 295 P.2d 328 (1956).
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the state, compensation for the loss of direct access has been allowed."
Other courts have held that mere circuity of route, resulting from such
a conversion, is not compensable in damages if there is available
another existing means of indirect access.5"
Necessity to Abut on an Existing Highway. While the abutter on
an existing service street converted into a limited or non-access high-
way is entitled to compensation, one abutting on a newly constructed
limited or non-access thoroughfare does not have a compensable right
if no highway facility existed there previously. In the latter instance,
there could be no easement of access to a non-existent highway and
therefore no compensation is granted to abutters on the new road. 1
In State v. Calkins2 eminent domain proceedings were brought to
condemn and appropriate a right of way across the premises of de-
fendant for the purpose of constructing a new limited access highway.
Defendant's farm bordered on the westerly side of a county road, and
was bounded on the north by a city street marking the limits of
Ephrata, Washington. The acquired east-west right of way bisected
the defendant's farm, leaving the north tract served only by the city
street, and the south tract by the county road. The defendant was
given a twenty-foot-wide approach on either side of the highway, for
the purpose of crossing the highway with farm equipment. The court
held that there had not been a constitutional taking of an alleged
easement of access to the highway, since no highway had previously
existed; therefore no easement could be claimed to the new limited
access road.
49 People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943) ; McMoran v. State, 155
Wash. Dec. 36, 354 P.2d 598 (1959) (where the highway department constructed a
concrete curb along the edge of the outside lane of a highway, which abutted plaintiff's
property, and a service road intended to be for local use and to give plaintiff and others
access to the highway at a point some distance from plaintiff's property; Held: plain-
tiff was entitled to damages for loss of direct access to the highway).
50 See People by Dept. of Pub. Works v. Schultz Co., 123 Cal. App.2d 925, 268 P.2d
117 (1954), which held that compensation was properly denied for the loss of a direct
access right to a highway which was converted to a freeway, where a new access right
of way of a proposed outer highway would be as good or better than the pre-existing
one. See also Iowa State Highway Comm'n v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755
(1957); Harreld v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 234 Miss. 1, 103 So. 2d 852
(1958); Muse v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 233 Miss. 694, 103 So. 2d 839
(1958) ; Gilmore v. State, 208 Misc. 427, 143 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1955) ; Carazalla v. State,
269 Wis. 593, 71 N.W.2d 276 (1955). Cf., Warren v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n,
250 Iowa 473, 93 N.W.2d 60 (1958) ; Oklahoma Turnpike Auth. v. Chandler, 316 P.2d
828 (Okla. 1957).
51 Schnider v. State, 38 Cal.2d 439, 241 P.2d 1 (1952) ; People v. Thomas, 108 Cal.
App.2d 832, 239 P.2d 914 (1952) ; Riddle v. State Highway Comm'n, 184 Kan. 603, 339
P.2d 301 (1959) ; Medearis v. State ex rel. Dept. of Highways, 341 P.2d 607 (Okla.
1959) ; State v. Calkins, 50 Wn.2d 716, 314 P.2d 449 (1957).52 Supra note 51.
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Compensable Claims by Nonabutting Owners. A different problem
is raised where the nonabutting owner claims damages for loss of
existing easements. This point has seldom been an issue in litigation,
except in circumstances creating a cul de sac.53 Little law, if any, can
be found on this general point. Several jurisdictions, including Wash-
ington, hold that private easements do not blend into public easements
arising by dedication." Therefore examination of the effect of con-
demnation on other types of property rights may prove helpful in
foreseeing how courts will solve this problem.
Where an instrument dedicated a park to public use in a subdivi-
sion,55 it was held that the execution of deeds to purchasers of the lots
gave them a fee to the park burdened with an easement right in all the
owners in the subdivision to use that park. Upon condemnation of the
east half, the lot owners directly across the street were entitled to
compensation, fixed at an amount including the value of the easement
rights they had in the park. The court recognized the easement as
extending to the use of the whole park, and therefore lot owners along
the west half (the half of the park not condemned) were also entitled
to compensation for the loss of their easement rights in the whole park.
This case is the clbsest example found to a situation where the non-
abutting owner sues for compensation arising from condemnation
which destroys existing private easements."8
5s See note 46 supra. It is possible to draw an analogy from the Ponischil case for
a cul de sac formed by the construction of a non-access highway over a strip where
there previously existed a land-service road. It is hoped that the court will not draw
such an analogy, when faced with the problem.
54 The theory upon which these easements will continue to exist entirely inde-
pendent of public rights growing out of dedication is by implied grant, implied cove-
nant, or estoppel. See Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 607, 628 (§ 5) (1949). See also note 19
supra.
55 United States v. 11.06 Acres of Land in City of St. Louis, Mo., 89 F. Supp 852(E.D. Mo. 1950).
50 In United States v. 4.105 Acres of Land in Pleasanton, 68 F. Supp. 279, 289
(N.D. Calif. 1946), where the government sought to condemn parcels of land for
the purpose of gaining access to an underground water supply, the city and county of
San Francisco claimed an interest in the water as an appurtenance to certain other
lands owned by the city in fee. The city claimed its right by virtue of a deed to it in
1930 from the water company that originally owned the land. The deed included an
easement or covenant allowing the city to take water from the lands sought to be
condemned. The court found that water rights granted to the city were primarily
covenants running with the land, thus burdening the successive owner, and were ac-
tually property rights in an easement sense. In holding that such rights were com-
pensable, the court stated: "a right with respect to real property need not attain the
dignity of 'an estate in real property' to be compensable when taken into the public
domain." The court further held that the water rights, which had been granted the
city, diminished the value of the condemned parcel adjacent to the municipally owned
land. Since such rights were easements appurtenant to the land conveyed to the city,




Another case" allowed compensation for the loss of easement rights
in a condemned alley which did not totally abut on the plaintiff's
property." The conveyance pre-dated the dedication by some two or
three years. Therefore, the court held that every person having bought
in reliance on the deed prior to dedication who had a need of access
over the alleys condemned (for public parking) had a right to be
compensated for the taking of the alley.
It would seem quite reasonable in the light of the above cases to
argue that the easement acquired (whether by reference to a plat, or
by merely abutting on the street which is altered) is definitely a
property right which, when taken, ought to be compensable through
the bringing of inverse condemnation.
Restrictive Covenants in the Subdivisions. Analogy can be made
to the rules governing restrictive covenants in subdivisions. Most of
these covenants arise in the context of building restrictions, but basic
principles of law indicate they are similar to easement rights, and are
often referred to as "negative easements."59 Two different theories
arise with regard to condemnation proceedings. The minority view is
that since all property is held subject to the power of eminent domain,
the rights of the condemnor are impliedly excepted from the operation
of restrictive covenants; and if not so excepted, the condemnor not
being a party or privy to the contract creating the covenant, no action
for damages will lie against the condemnor. ° The fallacy here is the
initial use of contract reasoning to determine a real property right. If
contract reasoning were applicable, the result is tenable since frustra-
tion of contract by legal means does not render the promisor liable in
damages. The majority view, on the other hand, rests on the theory
that a negative easement created by a building restriction is a vested
interest in the land, and therefore compensable by eminent domain
57 Trustees v. Public Parking Auth. of Pittsburgh, 383 Pa. 383, 119 A.2d 79 (1956).
58 See Cox's, Inc. v. Snodgrass, 372 Pa. 148, 92 A.2d 540 (1952).
59 7 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 3631 at p. 121 (perm. rev. ed. 1940) : "A restric-
tive covenant as applied to land creates what is known in law as an easement; that is,
a servitude without any profit whatever out of the substance of the neighboring
tenement, but merely the right to claim from it submission or forbearance.... An ease-
ment is negative in character when the owner of the servient tenement is restricted in
the exercise of the natural rights of property by the existence of the easement....
[I]t may be stated generally that, where a common grantor opens up a tract of land
to be sold in lots and blocks, and, before any lots are sold, inaugurates a general
scheme of improvement for such entire tract intended to enhance the value of each lot,
and each lot, subsequently sold by such grantor, is made subject to such scheme of
improvement, there is created and annexed to the entire tract what is termed a nega-
tive equitable easement, in which the several purchasers of lots have an interest, and
between whom there exists mutuality of covenant and consideration."
r0 See Board of Pub. Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d 637
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proceedings, if such covenants are violated by subsequent action taken
after condemnation. Under this view all property owners in the sub-
division are entitled to damages for the violation.6' The basic reason
for allowing damages is the decreased value of the property when the
nature of the neighborhood is changed by a violation of the restrictive
covenants.
In the City of Raleigh case62 the condemnor built an elevated water
tower on property within a subdivision having a restriction that only
residence buildings could be built therein. This violation entitled all
property owners in the subdivision to damages.
Violation of restrictive covenants by condemnation does not only
bind public authorities. Where a railroad purchased lots in a tract
subject to restrictions, including a prohibition against the erection of
any structure for business purposes, and built and maintained thereon
an electric railroad, the court found a deprivation of property rights
entitling the lot owners in the tract to compensation.63
In Burger v. City of St. Paul," the city council of St. Paul had
created a restricted residence district by condemnation proceedings.
Defendant subsequently obtained a permit from the council to remodel
his single dwelling into a fourplex-a definite violation of the restric-
tion. Plaintiff, a lot owner in the same subdivision, prevailed in an
action to enjoin the building of the fourplex. The court stated that
easements, whether in the nature of a right of way, a restrictive cove-
nant, or a negative or equitable easement (servitude) are property
within the meaning of the constitutional provisions against taking of
property without just compensation. Therefore the owners of lots in
this district acquired by virtue of the original condemnation, property
rights which attached to the ownership of the lots.
CONCLUSION
If the cases dealing with restrictive covenants are analyzed in the
(Fla. 1955), where it was held that restrictions in the general subdivision plans of the
town against erection or maintenance of buildings other than residences, duplexes,
apartments and hotels were defined as negative easements or equitable servitudes which
were not compensable in eminent domain proceedings. See also 18 Am. Jun., Eminent
Domain § 157 at p. 788; Annot., 122 A.L.R. 1464 (1939) ; 67 A.L.R. 385 (1930) ; 17
A.L.R. 554 (1922).
63 City of Raleigh v. Edwards, 235 N.C. 671, 71 S.E.2d 396 (1952) ; City of Shelby-
ville v. Kilpatrick, 322 S.W.2d 203 (Tenn. 1959). Both of these cases were first im-
pression cases in their respective jurisdictions. Both held that the violation of the
restriction, after condemnation proceedings were had, was compensable to the sur-
rounding property owners in the subdivision.
62 Supra note 61.63 Flynn v. New York W. & B. Ry., 218 N.Y. 140, 112 N.E. 913 (1916).
64 241 Minn. 285, 64 N.W.2d 73 (1954).
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light of holdings that private easements survive public vacation, it is
possible to argue that under the constitutional requirements of eminent
domain, payment must be made to all those who lose any property
rights due to public action taken, whether it be by condemnation of
property to build new highways or merely the alteration of an existing
road to develop a limited or non-access highway system. In the former
situation, while there would be no right of access to a newly built
freeway, there certainly would be a lost right if that highway were
built through the center of an existing subdivision. While the owners
in the subdivision cannot claim access rights in and to the freeway,
they can claim compensation for damages to easement rights they
possessed, prior to the public action, to reach other residences or
businesses in that subdivision.
One of the basic reasons little law can be found in this area is sim-
ply the lack of awareness on the part of attorneys and courts when
condemnation or vacation cases arise. They look only to the right to
question the vacation and not to the existence of private easement
rights. Since easements are characterized as property rights, depriva-
tion should entitle the person losing such to full compensation there-
for. This right can and should be protected by safeguards such as
eminent domain and inverse condemnation, both of which are tools
to assure the property owner his just compensation.
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